INTRODUCTION
As a relatively modern field of international law, international environmental law has, over its 40-year history, deliberately developed processes, institutions and substantive measures designed to specifically respond to global environmental threats such as climate change and the Sixth Extinction. It is the interest of the international community as a collective, in the environment and, consequently, in the implementation of environmental obligations, that requires a refinement of, if not a departure from, the traditional consent-based approach to international law. This modified approach has been demonstrated by the sometimes innovative response of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) to issues such as reservations, treaty amendment, compliance and dispute settlement. Moreover, in an effort to engage the maximum number of states -and, to a lesser extent, other actors -within a regime, MEAs have also developed flexible and differential obligations, blurring the traditional distinction between hard and soft law. Treaties have become "regimes" and regimes increasingly play a substantive role in the creation, implementation and enforcement of environmental law. Regimes interact with one another in what is described as a "regime complex" or "polycentric" system, and this interaction poses challenging questions about the relationship between treaty law and international institutional law, as well as the evolving nature of international law more generally.
This article will explore selected innovations within MEAs that have contributed to the dynamic evolution of international environmental law within the context of the traditional rules relating to treaties, international institutions and state responsibility. It will argue that whilst these innovations undoubtedly push and develop the boundaries of these areas of law, they do not represent a significant departure from the traditional principle of consent that underpins international law more generally. But should they? The period of modern international environmental law (from 1972 to date), which from a lawyer's perspective might be described as dynamic and innovative, has simultaneously witnessed significant and persistent environmental change and degradation across the biosphere, atmosphere and hydrosphere. We have already exceeded safe operating limits or planetary boundaries in respect of three of the nine areas of concern 1 and the extent to which humankind has become an ecological force in its own right has led some scientists to herald a new geological epoch: the Anthropocene. 2 The question for 21st century environmental lawyers is whether international environmental law is fit for the Anthropocene and whether there is sufficient scope for future dynamic evolution within the constraints and structures of the existing international legal system.
II APPLYING TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
The origin of an evolutionary development of international environmental law is that environmental obligations are largely (although not exclusively) law-making as opposed to contractual or synallagmatic. Environmental treaty obligations are not reciprocal in the traditional sense of being owed to individual or even a group of parties, but instead are owed to all parties or even to the international community as a whole. 3 This creates challenges for traditional rules relating to treaties and state responsibility, which are largely based on the notion of reciprocal obligations. The concept of reciprocity for example, underpins the default rules relating to treaty reservations under arts 19-23 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 4 as well as the principles relating to material breach. 5 Similarly, a direct relationship between states relating to injury or impact normally needs to be established for the application of the rules relating to state responsibility. 6 The relative absence of reciprocity underpinning obligations relating to the protection of the environment is not exclusive to international environmental law 7 but it is undoubtedly a defining feature of the discipline.
The response of international law generally to what Simma has described as a move "from bilateralism to community interest in international law" 8 lies in the creation of erga omnes obligations. 9 It is the notion of community interest, "'over and above any interests of the contracting parties individually" 10 that lies at the core of erga omnes obligations, and that community or collective interest is explicitly acknowledged in most if not all MEAs. But how does an erga omnes norm differ from a non-erga omnes norm in practical terms? The VCLT itself provides little, if any, recognition of erga omnes agreements. The Convention's recognition of a community or collective interest in a treaty is largely confined to developing principles to preserve that treaty -such as from the impacts of unduly wide reservations 11 or the unilateral termination of or withdrawal from a treaty in response to a non-material breach 12 -rather than acknowledging the potential of that treaty to impact on the rights and obligations of non-party states or the international community more generally. The VCLT largely dismisses the possibility that treaties may have legal consequences for non-party states without their express or implied consent, 13 and the international community as a collective or indeed its individual members is not apparently able to hold states to account for those obligations outside the recognised rules of state responsibility or the rules relating to breach of treaties. 14 Within the context of the MEA however, a low number of agreements do require parties to ensure that all states act consistently with the treaty, 15 or that non-parties provide comparable documentation or meet equivalent standards when trading or otherwise interacting with treaty parties. 16 Although in practical terms states may, as a consequence, effectively comply with treaties to which they are not a party, this is not a technical departure from the traditional third party rules as set out under the VCLT. The treaty obligation in question applies to treaty parties as opposed to non-parties, and rules relating to breach and state responsibility can be applied only to parties. Hazardous Waste). 17 The ban is formally imposed on (and thus can be enforced against) parties, notwithstanding its practical impact on non-parties.
More significantly for the purposes of the development of treaty law, MEAs have substantively developed and applied the concept of erga omnes inter partes. For example, most non-compliance mechanisms (NCPs) as developed by MEAs 18 provide for proceedings to be initiated by any state (and in some cases other participants such as treaty bodies or even non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) without that state having to prove that they have been injured or are otherwise especially affected by the breach. Even outside of non-compliance mechanisms, practice permitting parties to hold states to account for breaches of environmental treaties without having to establish injury or special impact is developing. For example, Australia in the Whaling Case successfully alleged that Japan was in breach of its obligations under Article VIII of the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling 19 without establishing that its own interests were affected above any other state party. 20
III DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WITHIN MEAS
As noted above, MEAs have been particularly dynamic in the development of treaty law in order to respond to the community or erga omnes interest in environmental obligations. As such, MEAs have focused on maximising the universal law-making impact of treaties as well as providing for innovative means to adapt, develop and enforce those obligations. Superficially they appear to impact the notion of consent, which is fundamental to international law, but in reality consent is largely preserved even if only at the point of ratification. These developments therefore arguably represent an adaptation of, rather than a departure from, traditional treaty law. 
A Reservations
One of the most important features of MEAs has been the move towards a general prohibition of unilateral reservations to the treaty's principal provisions. 21 Most modern MEAs prohibit reservations to the principal instrument in order to preserve the integrity of the commitments undertaken, reflecting the community interest in the objects and purposes of the treaty. 22 This is in direct contrast to the approach of human rights treaties for example, which can also be characterised as embodying a community interest. The trend within international environmental law is so ubiquitous that it might be argued that it constitutes an emerging customary norm within the field. This notwithstanding, it must be acknowledged that whilst reservations are typically prohibited in respect of the body of the treaty they are commonly permitted in respect of obligations relating to individual species, substances or measures listed in the appendices or annexes of MEAs. 23 More generally, even where reservations are prohibited states may nevertheless unilaterally limit the extent to which they implement a commitment where qualified or differential language is used to frame the obligation in question. 24
B Developing Dynamic Treaties Through Amendment, Interpretation and Decision-Making
In an area where rapid developments in science and, to a lesser extent, ethics and values significantly impact legal and policy approaches to environmental problems, the ability to respond flexibly to those developments is crucial to the success of any MEA. The primary rule, as set out in the VCLT is that "[a] treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties". 25 24 See for example UNFCCC, above n 3, art 3(1) requiring parties to "protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (emphasis added). Of course a "unilateral" interpretation of a treaty may be challenged by other parties and subject to international adjudication. 25 VCLT, above n 4, art 39.
occurred in relation to the appendices or annexes of those instruments not least in the utilisation of the Conference of the Parties (COPs) as the primary institution for the consideration and adoption of amendments. A significant feature of many MEAs is the tacit amendment procedure, whereby amendments will automatically enter into force for all parties unless parties expressly notify the depository otherwise. The tacit amendment procedure typically applies to amendments of appendices and annexes to treaties rather than to the treaty itself, although the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury 26 unusually permits a new annex to be adopted by means of tacit amendment. 27 Tacit and analogous amendment procedures serve a valuable function in facilitating the rapid updating of MEAs and maximising the likely acceptance of those amendments as states are forced to opt out rather than to opt in. However, in almost all MEAs state consent and the principle of sovereignty is preserved as states may ultimately opt out and refuse to be bound by an amendment if they so choose. This procedure therefore simply provides an example of the "any other means if so agreed" as envisaged in Article 11 of the VCLT. A greater challenge to the traditional rules on amendment is posed by the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which permits adjustments to its technical annexes agreed to in the absence of consensus on the basis of a two-third majority (including "double" majorities of developed and developing countries) to take effect for all parties with no further ability to opt out. 28 This process is, however, thus far unique among MEAs.
Without formally amending a treaty, institutions such as COPs may nevertheless adopt decisions -binding and non-binding -often on a majority basis, which in practical terms significantly affect the scope or the implementation of obligations under the treaty. For example, in 1986, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 29 COP adopted a resolution creating a quota system permitting limited trade in Appendix I species, such as the leopard, subject to specified conditions. 30 The practical effect of this resolution was an informal amendment of CITES or, at a minimum, the adoption of a very particular interpretation of the obligation laid down in of states is principally a matter for international institutional law rather than treaty law per se. 41 However, it is evident that some MEAs have deliberately developed these institutional procedures to "overcome the cumbersome treaty-making process" 42 in order to respond to environmental challenges. 43
C Material Breach and Non-Compliance with MEAs
The rules relating to material breach as set out in Article 60 of the VCLT 44 provide a rare example of where the Convention makes a limited distinction between law-making and contractual treaties. 45 Taken as a whole, the provision seeks to balance the rights of the collective in supporting the stability of the agreement with the right of an injured party to obtain appropriate remedy and redress in the event of breach. The principle of negative reciprocity, which underpins Article 60 of the VCLT, 46 is most clearly demonstrated in its requirement that a party can only unilaterally 47 suspend a multilateral treaty as against the party in breach where they have been especially affected by the breach 48 or where the breach radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of their obligations under the treaty. 49 In short, the party wishing to suspend an agreement against a party 47 States parties to an agreement may choose to suspend or terminate a treaty against a party in breach or in its entirety by unanimous agreement: VCLT, above n 4, art 60(2)(a).
Article 60(2)(b).
49 Article 60(2)(c).
in breach must have a "particular interest" in the performance of the obligation in question, "which goes beyond that of the other parties to the treaty." 50 This requirement, combined with the highthreshold definition of material breach, 51 would seem to render the application of Article 60 of the VCLT largely irrelevant to the typical MEA where obligations are generally erga omnes partes rather than clearly reciprocal in nature. 52 During the negotiations of the VCLT Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice advocated that states should not be permitted to unilaterally suspend multilateral treaties in response to breach. 53 Although his argument was rejected in general terms, a specific exception was provided for in Article 60(5) of the VCLT, which denies the right to suspend or terminate humanitarian treaties in the event of breach. 54 Responding to the inadequacy of Article 60 of the VCLT in respect of community-focused environmental obligations, more than twenty MEAs have developed or are in the process of developing internal procedures to deal with parties in breach or, as it is now commonly termed, in non-compliance with the treaty. 55 Typically, an MEA non-compliance procedure (NCP) is managed by a designated institution established by the treaty, and any party in non-compliance may be referred to that institution by other parties, by itself or, 56 increasingly, by a treaty institution such as the 50 Simma and Tams, above n 44, at 1365.
51 Article 60(3) of the VCLT, above n 4, defines a material breach as a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by that treaty or a violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment to the object or purpose of that treaty.
52 The VCLT, above n 4, is silent on the consequences of a non-material breach and the extent to which an uninjured party may challenge a party in breach. secretariat or meeting of the parties. 57 In a minority of cases proceedings can even be initiated by an appropriately qualified NGO or an individual. 58 This multilateral as opposed to reciprocal response to breach, which is further enhanced by the increasing levels of public participation within noncompliance proceedings, 59 has been developed by MEAs operating in the areas of climate change, ozone depletion, wildlife protection, biodiversity conservation, pollution prevention and control and fisheries management among others. 60 Moreover, in contrast to the coercive approach which characterises the traditional response to a breach of treaty as developed by the law of treaties and the rules relating to countermeasures, non-compliance proceedings generally adopt a more facilitative approach, and measures adopted by compliance bodies are often designed to assist rather than to punish a state in non-compliance with their treaty obligations. 61 The preference for facilitation rather than coercion has recently been expressed by the parties to the 2015 Paris Agreement in Article 15, which establishes that the new NCP shall, in contrast to the Kyoto NCP, be "facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive".
The relationship between NCPs and the more traditional rules relating to breach of treaty, dispute resolution and countermeasures is not clear. 62 On one hand, it might be argued that NCPs constitute specialised rules of application to breach within MEAs and, consequently, must be applied instead of the default rules relating to breach and countermeasures. 63 On the other hand, it can be argued that a compliance measure which is neither binding nor established pursuant to a binding regime cannot be applied instead of the traditional rules of dispute resolution and responding to breach. Moreover, NCPs are generally not comprehensive, and their scope may be limited to dealing with the consequences of designated treaty provisions. Typically, obligations associated with technical and financial support are excluded from the non-compliance process. 64 In principle therefore, noncompliance procedures arguably supplement and support the traditional rules relating to treaties, countermeasures and dispute resolution rather than replacing them. In practice however, NCPs are in effect replacing traditional rules owing to their ability to respond more sensitively to the erga omnes and non-reciprocal nature of environmental obligations. 65 
D Blurring the Distinction between Soft and Hard Law
The distinction between so-called "soft" and "hard" law in the field of international environmental law is increasingly and indeed deliberately blurred. The corpus of the discipline comprises many commitments that are not obviously binding but which are exceedingly influential: the 2010 Aichi Biodiversity Targets 66 Within treaties, which are themselves binding, high level commitments or statements of principle are sometimes described as "soft". 71 Moreover, in this field more than any other treaties may provide for differential obligations relating to the scope, nature and timing of the obligations within a treaty. 72 Typically referred to as common but differentiated responsibilities (and respective capabilities) (CBDRRC), the first treaty to incorporate CBDRRC in a structured way was the 1987 Montreal Protocol, and this flexible and innovative approach to the creation of treaty obligations is integral to the success of the ozone regime. 73 The principle underpins the climate regime 74 and is enshrined in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which applies emissions commitments only to Annex I states. 75 To the extent that MEAs permit the exercise of state discretion in determining the level of commitment or action on the basis of capacity (sometimes referred to as contextual differentiation) then those commitments may also be described as "soft" or, at the very least, demonstrating modern "variations" of "hard law". 76 Arguably this blurring of hard and soft law has been taken to a whole new level in the 2015 Paris Agreement, which uniquely (thus far) permits states to unilaterally determine their level of commitment in respect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and/or enhancing sinks in light of the overall target of restricting temperature rise to no more than two degrees Celsius. 77 Whilst the Paris Agreement itself is clearly legally binding (in contrast to, for example, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord) there is uncertainty as to whether the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are themselves legally binding with some commentators arguing that they are legally binding 78 and others suggesting that the NDCs themselves are not but the various administrative obligations associated with them (such as reporting) are. 79 One scholar has gone so far as to describe the Paris Agreement as "an exemplar of new lawmaking". 80 
IV BUILDING REGIMES UNDER TREATY LAW
Liberated from international relations scholarship the term "regime" is used in international law to describe a particularly dynamic and innovative approach to law-making adopted by most MEAs. This approach typically comprises: a framework or over-arching convention setting out guiding principles, general obligations and establishing institutions; protocols or annexes developing the substance of the regime; and formal decisions and resolutions adopted by the conference or meeting of the parties intended to guide, inform or develop its implementation. 81 Typically the MEA establishes institutions such as a decision-making body (COP or MOP), a secretariat, technical bodies, a financial mechanism, and, increasingly, a compliance body. 82 Examples of regimes (in contrast to treaties) include the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its eight protocols, 83 the 1979 Convention on Migratory Species and its seven Agreements, 84 19 Memoranda of Understanding and four special species initiatives, and the 1992 UNFCCC and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement. In creating their own "institutional apparatuses", 85 often described as "autonomous institutional arrangements", 86 MEAs create and in doing so "become themselves machineries for the making and development of international environmental law". 87 In this sense MEAs might be described as "quasi-constitutional" treaties. 88 Nevertheless, while the locus of decision-making, where decisions can be adopted by consensus, has formally shifted from states to an institution -the COP -states are not bound by decisions in the absence of their consent even under simplified or expedited treaty amendment procedures, with the one exception of adjustments to the Montreal Protocol, as noted above. 89 Of arguably greater significance is the function performed by these institutions in developing the interpretation and implementation of treaties by virtue of decision-making and their role in responding to non-compliance, as described above.
V LINKING AND LEVERAGING REGIMES
The term "fragmentation" describes "the emergence of specialised and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal practice", 90 and is typically used to emphasise the isolation and disconnect between regimes and institutions as well as treaty congestion. 91 Whilst of relevance to international law generally, the term has particular resonance in the area of international environmental law where the contrast between autonomous and, to an extent, isolated treaty regimes, with the integrated ecological ecosystems they are designed to manage, is particularly stark. It is thus unsurprising that one of the most important dynamic evolutionary developments within this field has been the development of institutional connections or linkages between MEAs, designed to unleash "hidden synergies between regimes". 92 Between MEAs: 93 (2018) 49 VUWLR … linkage and institutional interaction operate on a number of levels and may arise as a mere consequence of ecological, sociological or functional interdependence or as a result of a deliberate governance strategy.
Both inadvertent and deliberate linkages can be identified between MEAs, but deliberate coordination, in relation to information sharing, the development of joint initiatives and, rarely, the pooling of resources exemplify linkage as described by international relations scholars. For example, the 1992 Biodiversity Convention 94 has entered into formal relationships with 18 other MEAs, 95 as well as over 140 memoranda of understanding with other bodies including scientific institutions, universities and botanical gardens. 96 It has developed active programmes of coordination with the socalled biodiversity cluster. 97 The most extensive example of formal institutional cooperation has been developed by the Basel, Stockholm 98 and Rotterdam 99 Conventions -the so-called chemicals cluster -which have held a series of joint meetings at which joint (synergies) decisions have been adopted to develop joint work programmes and develop administrative synergies between the three conventions including the appointment of an Executive Secretary of all three Conventions. 100 These connections and linkages between regimes have given rise to new descriptions of environmental governance, which is sometimes described as polycentric 101 or underpinned by network structure 102 or, drawing on comparisons with ecosystems, a "complex adaptive system." 103 The most widely used description of this new form of environmental governance is "regime complex" defined as a system "of functionally overlapping institutions that continuously affect each other's operations." 104 Regime complexes can be found across the field of international environmental law and, as a concept, has been explored in the context of climate change 105 and biodiversity 106 -and indeed the relationship between climate change and biodiversity 107 -and is no longer confined to MEA structures but also encompasses private authorities. 108 A recent example of regime complex in action is the adoption of the 2016 Kigali Amendment to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer to phase out hydroflurcarbons (HFCs), a powerful greenhouse gas, a measure predicted to prevent approximately 0.5 degrees of warming by 2100 thus contributing to efforts to address climate change. 109 These forms of arrangements between MEAs -whether deliberate or inadvertent -raise important legal questions associated with the status and capacity of MEA institutions to enter into such arrangements, the status of the agreements themselves and the impact of those agreements on the obligations of states, particularly where membership of the agreements cooperating is not coincidental. In short, the regime and the regime complex create both opportunities and challenges for traditional consent-based international law. effectiveness and ecological effectiveness and achieving the former does not guarantee the latter 115 -a conclusion seemingly unchallengeable when considered against the state of the global environment in 2018. Kim and Bosselman criticise initiatives that merely seek to address normative fragmentation 116 and argue instead for legal interpretation that builds "systemic relationships between rules by envisaging them as part of the shared purpose", 117 underpinned by the principle of ecological integrity which operates as a form of "grundnorm". 118 Or is international law as a system incapable of meaningful environmental protection? Natarajan and Khoday conclude that "our disciplinary creeds ties us in overt and subtle ways to particular relationships with the natural environment" that "systematically reinforce ecological harm". 119 This conclusion, although underpinned by justifiable criticism of the relationship between humankind and nature, is excessively bleak and overlooks developments in environmental policy and ethics that have occurred in the last 50 years. Its truth, however, lies in the acknowledgment that there are limits to dynamic evolution of international environmental law under the current system, and future effectiveness of environmental law will likely be dependent upon a significant shift in ethical and political thinking around ecological protection in the Anthropocene rather than mere development of legal processes and principles in the Holocene.
